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Abstract
The associations between fertility and outcomes in the family and society have been treated as
causal, but this is inaccurate if fertility is a choice coordinated by families with other life-cycle
decisions, including labour supply of mothers and children, child human capital, and savings. 
Estimating how exogenous changes in fertility that are uncorrelated with preferences or
constraints affect others depends on our specifying a valid instrumental variable for fertility. 
Twins have served as such an instrument and confirm that the cross-effects of fertility estimated
on the basis of this instrument are smaller in absolute value than their associations.
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Fertility is a choice by parents involving a life-cycle claim on their resources, from which they 
may receive satisfaction as consumers and benefit as producers from children’s labour and care-
giving support. In addition, fertility may be the source of externalities that affect members of 
society other than the decision-making parents, in which case society may view fertility as a 
legitimate issue for social policy.  To forecast fertility and the conditions under which public 
policies might be justified to modify fertility, economists require a basic understanding of its 
determinants as well as social consequences. In approaching this topic from the perspective of 
low-income countries today, the ideas of Malthus remain influential.  He argued that population 
growth caused by high fertility erodes the welfare and productivity of workers, and thus social 
policy which fostered greater fertility, such as the English Poor Law, contributed to 
‘overpopulation’.  Before considering how these spillover effects of fertility might be identified, 
an overview of historical thinking about the demographic–economic system may help to indicate 
the context in which Malthus’s thinking was relevant to pre-industrial Europe, and how modern 
economics has extended his thinking to fertility as a lifetime choice of parents related to their time 
allocation and accumulation of human and physical capital. 
 
Malthus’ framework for the pre-industrial demographic–economic equilibrium 
The determinants of fertility have engaged the interest of economists for some time.  Adam Smith 
(1776) noted families were larger in settings where labour was scarce and child labour was 
especially valuable to parents, as in North America with its abundant land.  Smith recognized that 
child mortality was higher among the poor, especially among those who were dependent on 
charity (for example, the Poor Laws).  However, Malthus (1798) viewed fertility not as an 
individual choice but as an outcome of social institutions, because he did not think birth control 
was effective.  He thought fertility was governed by the economic requirements society placed on 
a couple before allowing them to marry.  Once married, the ‘constant passion of the sexes’ would 
lead in unregulated fashion to fertility. Society therefore restricted entry into marriage to those 
with favourable prospects for a livelihood or the income and assets to support the children that 
were expected to follow from the union.  Over his lifetime, Malthus accumulated corroborating 
evidence on fertility, population growth and economic growth.  Historians have since added to 
Malthus’s evidence, confirming that Europe exhibited a late median age at marriage for a woman 
in her mid-twenties.  This delay in childbearing led European women to have four or five births   3
over their lifetime, rather than the six or seven if they had married five years earlier.  Given the 
short life expectancy in pre-industrial Europe of about 35–40 years, this restrained level of 
fertility diminished substantially the resulting rate of population growth, except at frontiers of 
settlement where labour was scarce, land abundant, and marriage consequently early. 
  Heckscher (1963) thought Malthus’s framework was relevant to Sweden.  With the 
Swedish church’s good records of marriages, births and deaths, and the Swedish king’s need to 
estimate crop yields (for the purposes of taxation), annual time series for Sweden after 1720 
appear accurate and show a positive covariation in marriage and fertility with good crop years, 
and shortfalls in marriage and subsequently fertility following poor crop years.  Temperature and 
rainfall data available for Sweden after 1750 allow later analysts to incorporate this exogenous 
variation in weather and employ vector autoregression to estimate weather-driven Malthusian 
cycles in wages, fertility, as well as mortality (Eckstein, Schultz and Wolpin, 1984). 
  Working with French and Swiss parish registries of marriage, births, and deaths, Louis 
Henry (1972), the demographer, found evidence that couples exhibited a ‘natural’ rate of 
childbearing after marriage, until they eventually began to increase the intervals between their 
births after later parities, if economic conditions became less favourable.  The emergence of this 
form of parity-specific application of birth control over the life cycle of marriages was interpreted 
by Coale (1973) as an indicator of the onset of the ‘demographic transition’, when cultural 
restraints on fertility evolved from ‘natural’ proximate determinants to controlled ‘modern’ 
reproductive behaviour relying primarily on birth control.  
  Parish registries were then sampled from England from 1541 to 1871 by Wrigley and 
Schofield (1981) to further investigate the Malthusian framework.  Lee (1981) found that 
increases in marriage and birth rates were related to good weather and resulting declines in the 
price of wheat, as Malthus would have expected.  But only about half of the covariation in 
weather/prices and annual birth rates is due to the fluctuations in first births that follow in the 
wake of variations in marriage. The other half is explained by variation in the length of inter-birth 
intervals. The latter finding casts doubt on Malthus’s view that in this pre-industrial period 
couples did not exercise fertility choices within marriage.  This spacing of births in response to 
economic wage cycles implied that the adoption of parity-specific birth control may not have 
been a cultural innovation, as assumed by Coale, but a customary form of individual behaviour 
adopted when additional births were unwanted.   Some couples in pre-industrial societies appear   4
able and willing to practice effective birth control when motivated economically.  Fertility is thus 
to some degree a voluntary choice variable within marriage even in pre-industrial societies. 
  As the Industrial Revolution progressed in Europe and real wages increased, fertility 
nonetheless began to decline widely by the end of the 19th century.  The Malthusian framework 
needed to be amended further to fit this experience in Europe and be applicable to low-income 
countries after 1960 as new methods of family planning were disseminated in the world and 
fertility fell despite modern economic growth.  How was the secular decline in fertility to be 
explained in the face of rising personal incomes?  The decline in child mortality, which gathered 
speed after 1870, reduced the need for parents to have extra births to replace the one out of five 
who might have at earlier times died from childhood diseases and infections.  Parents might also 
scale back their demand for ‘insurance’ births motivated to reduce the likelihood that a couple 
would sustain above average child losses (Schultz, 1981).  Becker (1960) proposed that the 
relative price of rearing children increased over time, causing the decline in parents’ demand for 
children.  Mincer (1963) hypothesized that an increase in women’s wages increased a couple’s 
opportunity cost of having children, raising the shadow price of children. He argued that the rise 
in female labour-force participation and the decline in fertility were both caused by conditions 
increasing women’s wages relative to other consumer prices and men’s wages.  These empirical 
patterns in the United States were soon replicated in other high-income countries.   
  Changing the relative prices of outputs of the economy is one possible source of variation 
in women’s wages relative to men’s that could explain changes in fertility. Men’s labour in 
European agriculture was critical for plowing and producing food grains, whereas women 
specialized in home production as domestic servants and wives and to some degree in animal 
husbandry and the production of dairy commodities.  Consequently, changing scarcity of grains 
relative to livestock and dairy product contributed to swings in the relative wages of men and 
women in Europe.  The secular decline in international grain prices relative to dairy and livestock 
prices in the latter half of the 19th century was unprecedented due to the opening of new lands at 
the frontiers of European settlement in the United States and Russia, and contributed along with 
changes in production technologies to the rise in women’s agricultural wages relative to men’s in 
northern Europe and to the decline in fertility. Swedish historical data by region document after 
1860 the fall in world grain prices, the associated increase in the wages of women relative to men, 
and the secular fall in fertility, when other developments are controlled for (Schultz, 1985).    5
  Another factor credited with reducing fertility is the improvement in birth control 
technology, which reduced the monetary and psychic cost of limiting births, and provided 
techniques controlled by women, which were independent of sex.  The major advances in 
technology occurred in the 1960s with the introduction of oral steroids (the pill) and the intra-
uterine device (IUD), followed by further refinements in their delivery systems.  Traditional 
mechanisms for population control such as abortion, infanticide, coitus interruptus, and condoms 
have nonetheless allowed individuals to adjust their family size and affect population growth in 
various periods and parts of the world, well before the advent of these modern means of birth 
control.  Although they may have facilitated the later demographic transition, these birth control 
technologies do not appear to have been necessary. 
 
Microeconomic models of fertility behaviour 
Willis (1973) adapted a comparative advantage trade model to the household lifetime fertility 
choice problem, wherein women’s education was assumed to enhance women’s productivity only 
in the market, and thereby increase the relative price of home production and decrease their 
demand for fertility.  In his economic treatise on the family, Becker (1981) assigns a central role 
to market/non-market specialization of spouses in the household, with childbearing and rearing 
being the dominant non-market production activity traditionally performed by women.   
  To place more structure on fertility choices, Becker (1960; 1981) and Willis (1973) 
hypothesize that parents viewed the human capital of their children (child quality) as a substitute 
for their number of children (child quantity).  If this were the case, then by definition income-
compensated cross-price effects should be positive between child quantity and quality. In other 
words, increasing the price of children, for example by reducing the cost of birth control, would 
directly decrease fertility and indirectly increase the demand for child quality (with income held 
constant). Conversely, increasing the wage returns to schooling in the labour market would 
directly increase the demand for schooling and indirectly decrease the demand for births.  Becker 
and Lewis (1974) postulate further that the income elasticity of demand for child quality exceeded 
the positive income elasticity for child quantity, which could account for the paradoxical decline 
in fertility with growth in income, without having to assume that children (quantity) are an 
‘inferior’ good for which income effects are negative, or to show increases in women’s value of 
their time in the modern economy caused the decline in their fertility.   6
  The decline in fertility by half in high-income countries during the 20th century brought 
population growth to a halt in many of these countries.  The decline in fertility by more than half 
in low-income countries in 40 years (1965–2005) is not yet comprehensively accounted for, 
although demographers are agreed that these trends in fertility are irreversible and the size of the 
world’s population will stabilize later in the 21st century.  How much does each of these 
conceptually distinct factors economists have described explain of this remarkable decline in 
fertility?  I do not yet find a consensus on how to weight these factors in explaining cohort 
fertility. What fraction is due to an exogenous decline in mortality, the decline in the relative 
value of child labour, the increase in the value of women’s time used in child care and the related 
increase in their empowerment, the increase in returns to schooling children, the greater income 
elasticities of demand for child quality than for quantity, and finally the improvements in birth 
control technology?  
 
Identifying the effect of fertility on the welfare of families and society 
The policy-relevant externalities of fertility could arise at the aggregate level or in terms of 
substitution effects within families.  Malthus assumed that fertility added to subsequent 
generations of workers, which reduced their wages and also changed the age composition of the 
population. But empirical evidence for these aggregate effects of fertility has not led to a 
consensus on their importance for today’s low-income countries (National Research Council, 
1986).  At the microeconomic level of the family, fertility is found to be closely associated with 
other life-cycle choices by parents, including the share of time women allocate to the market 
economy, the investments parents make in the human capital of each of their children, and 
perhaps the savings out of income they accumulate in physical capital, possibly for old age 
support or precautionary insurance.  But to assess the magnitude of these cross-effects of fertility, 
researchers must first specify an exogenous factor (not a choice variable within the orbit of the 
family) that affects fertility but leaves other constraints on the family life-cycle choices and 
outcomes unaffected and is unrelated to parent preferences (Schultz, 2005).  In other words, an 
exclusion restriction or a valid instrumental variable is needed to account for some part of the 
variation in fertility that is independent of parent preferences and family life-cycle economic 
constraints. Otherwise, these cross-effects observed at the family level may not be causal and 
cannot be expected to occur when population policies reduce (or increase) fertility.   7
    Twins are proposed by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980; 2000) as a ‘shock’ to the quantity 
of children that is uncorrelated with parent preferences or unobserved determinants of other 
family and child outcomes.  Adjustment of investment in the schooling of other children in the 
family due to the occurrence of twins can then test the quantity–quality substitution hypothesis.  
They found support for the trade-off of quantity–quality on non-twin siblings in rural Indian 
households observed in 1970.  A larger sample of twins collected in China provides the basis for 
estimating the impact of a twin on the quality of earlier- or later-born siblings, providing bounds 
to the magnitude of the cross effects, adjusted for substitution effects between siblings 
(Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2006). However, when twins are an instrument for fertility, the 
estimated quantity–quality trade-off tends to be smaller in absolute value than when estimated by 
direct association, that is, ordinary least squares (OLS).  This could be due to the twin instrument 
being weak either because it occurs for only a small fraction of births (for example, one per cent) 
or because the underlying causal relationship is in fact weak and appears important only in biased 
single-equation associations (that is, OLS).  The heterogeneity in parent preferences or other 
unobserved determinants of behavior could inversely affect child quantity and quality (Schultz, 
2005).  
  Other studies have exploited twins as an instrument for fertility to assess how exogenous 
fertility affects the mother’s market labour supply. These studies in high- and low-income 
countries generally confirm that the twin instrumental variable estimate of the effect of a birth on 
the mother’s market labour supply tends to be absolutely smaller (negative) than the OLS 
estimate.  The Durbin–Wu–Hausman specification test rejects the exogeneity of fertility in the 
determination of the mother’s allocation of time to market work (Schultz, 2005), implying that the 
consistent instrumental variable estimate is preferred over the OLS estimate.  
  This twin-based cross effect of fertility on mothers’ labour supply may help to explain 
how policies which reduce fertility can facilitate modern economic growth, by adding to the per 
capita supply of labour and increasing the human capital of future generations. Finally, if parents 
when they have fewer children increase life-cycle savings for their support in old age, policies 
that facilitate a decline in fertility could raise savings and further augment growth rates. But 
estimates of these three potential cross effects of fertility-reducing population policies remain 
currently speculative. 
  The other instrument commonly used to identify the consequences of fertility on the   8
welfare of families relies on the sex composition of births, and has serious drawbacks.  This 
variable may significantly affect parents’ decisions on whether to have further children, and it 
may be assumed to be approximately independent of parent preferences or family constraints if 
there is no sex-selective abortion or infanticide.  But this variable may not satisfy the criteria for a 
valid instrument, because the social and economic consequences of a child’s sex involve many 
culturally distinct costs and benefits for his or her parents, such as the provision of dowries for 
daughters in some parts of the world. Thus, the sex composition of early births is likely to involve 
lifetime wealth effects for parents, in addition to affecting fertility, giving rise to many changes in 
family time allocation, expenditure patterns, and life-cycle savings (Rose, 2000).  Therefore, the 
sex composition of children is not an instrumental variable for estimating how parents respond to 
a change in their fertility due to a population policy, if income and other family constraints are 
held constant.  Finally, it should be noted that population policies may on the one hand subsidize 
learning and use of birth control, or at the other extreme fix a birth quota, as in China.  There is no 
reason to expect expanding voluntary choices in the first case will have the same effect as 
rationing choices in the other policy regime.  
 
Conclusions and research challenges 
Parents may altruistically internalize in their fertility decisions the effects of their fertility on their 
welfare and that of their children, including investments in child quality and lifetime savings in 
financial assets (Becker, 1981).  These parents are typically assumed to have secure property 
rights to their savings and access to financial institutions that minimize credit constraints. 
Population policies that reduce the cost of avoiding unwanted births may also be expected to 
affect gender empowerment, which does not enter decisively in the unitary model of the family 
proposed by Becker, but emerges in various recent bargaining and collective models of the 
family.  Women may differentially gain from improved control of reproduction, because they 
physically bear the health costs of having births and invest disproportionately their time in child 
rearing.  To derive predictions on how family bargaining affects fertility or vice versa requires 
more context-specific assumptions.  Do mothers or fathers value children more highly? Does 
improved birth control technology empower women to bargain for a larger share of the gains from 
marriage?  These remain open questions for more study.  Women may value children as much as 
men do, and use their own increases in wealth to have more.  Increased unearned income owned   9
by the wife is associated, if the husband’s income is held constant, with higher fertility in 
Thailand but not in Brazil (Schultz, 1990). Microcredit targeted to groups of women in 
Bangladesh increases women’s earnings and increases their later fertility (Pitt et al, 1999).   
  In an experimentally designed family planning and health programme started in 1977 for 
women in rural villages of Matlab, Bangladesh, the women in villages benefiting from the 
programme had one fewer child by 1996 than did comparable women in comparison villages 
(Joshi and Schultz, 2007).  The programme is also associated with increased woman’s health, as 
measured by their body mass index (weight divided by height squared), reduced child mortality 
before age five, and increased years of schooling of boys aged 9–14 and 15–29. More studies of 
these long-run consequences of population policies on fertility and other family outcomes will be 
needed to assess the within-family consequences of fertility and population policies. Recognition 
that fertility is endogenous to other family life-cycle choices challenges economists to measure 
these potentially important life-cycle causal connections, and thereby provide a sounder basis for 
evaluating how population policies affects the social allocation of resources.   10
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